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TRANSIT CO. v. FAULKNER

retreated from its earlier holding in the partnership case, 2
which was the only one of great persuasive influence on
the point involved. It is regrettable that a doctrine, stemming from the rapidly disappearing (if not obsolete) fiction of identity of husband and wife, should have led the
Court to affirm the unwise social result of the instant case,
particularly when it is contrary to the weight of authority
and the law expressed in the Restatement of Agency.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Baltimore TransitCompany v. Faulkner'
Two cases, both entitled Baltimore Transit Company v.
Faulkner,one having been instituted by Faulkner and the
other by his son, were tried together. The plaintiffs, who
were driving in the father's car, had a collision with one
Michlick at a busy intersection in Baltimore City. Michlick having admitted that he was at fault, Faulkner, nevertheless, insisted upon taking pictures of the automobiles.
Consequently, a traffic jam resulted and several employees
of the Baltimore Transit Company, whose duty it is to
keep the tracks clear, attempted to remove the cars. To
this, Faulkner objected; but the defendant's employees persisted in disengaging the cars. Faulkner started a fight in
which his son joined. The father and son thereafter sued
the Baltimore Transit Company for an assault and battery
allegedly caused by defendant's employees. The lower
court found that defendant's employees were guilty of an
though Faulkner had been the
assault and battery even
2
initiator of the affray.
Having agreed with the trial court on this phase of the
case, the Court of Appeals focused its attention on a consideration of the problem of awarding exemplary damages.
The lower court had instructed the jury in each case that
if they found that the assault and battery committed by
defendant's employees was "wanton and excessive" they
could award not only actual damages but also such further
punitive damages as they might think proper from the
26
1

David v. David, supra, n. 9.

20 A. (2d) 485 (1941).
2 Defendant had sought to justify the assault on the ground that its
employees had acted in self-defense, but as the plea did not allege that no
more force than the exigency reasonably demanded was used, it was defective.
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evidence. The jury had awarded punitive damages to the
plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that there was not legally sufficient evidence to justify
such an award.
The Maryland law as to the awarding of exemplary
damages was laid down in Sloan v. Edwards.3 In that
case, plaintiff had published in a local newspaper an item
which unfavorably commented on the firm of which defendant was a member. On the following day, defendant sought out plaintiff in order to demand an explanation. A fight ensued and plaintiff brought an action
to recover for the alleged assault and battery. The Court
said ". . . if an assault has been committed maliciously or
wantonly, the jury are not restricted to compensatory damages, but may give in addition thereto such exemplary
damages as the circumstances of the case may warrant."
Thus, in order to recover exemplary damages, plaintiff
must show that either malice or wantonness characterized
defendant's act, a malicious assault being one committed
intentionally and a wanton assault being one done under
circumstances evincing a reckless disregard of consequences.'
There are only four states, namely, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Louisiana, and Indiana,5 which have held contra, the leading American case opposing the doctrine of
exemplary damages on principle being that of Fay v.
Parker,6 in New Hampshire. It is interesting to note in
passing that this case overruled the earlier one of Towle v.
Blake7 which had held, along with the great weight of authority, that where there are circumstances of aggravation
indicating malice, insult, oppression, or wanton or willful
violence, exemplary damages might be allowed. Be that
as it may, the New Hampshire Court saw fit to swing from
this view, and in Fay v. Parker8 the Court based is decision to repudiate the doctrine of exemplary damages on
the consideration that the wrong in question was one for
which the wrongdoer could be punished criminally. However, the fact that the act done by defendant is one for
which he may be punished criminally is not determinative
361

Md. 89 (1883).
WORDS AND PHRASUS (Perm. Ed.) 604.
rBoyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1878) ; McVay v. Ellis, 148 La. 247, 86 So. 783
(1921) ; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 (1874) ; Pixley v. Catey, 102 Ind. App.
658, 1 N. E. (2d) 658 (1936).
6 Supra, n. 5.
748
N. H. 92 (1868).
8 Supra, n. 5.
4 44
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with most courts, and properly so. For, as is pointed out
in the case of Wagner v. Gibbs,9 the criminal action is a
punishment for the wrong done to the public while the
punitive damage is a punishment for the wrong done to
the individual.
The courts which have allowed exemplary damages are
not in accord, though, as to either the theory behind or
the application of the doctrine. The chief divergences
occur as to: (1) the purpose of the allowance of exemplary damages, (2) the amount thereof, and (3) whether
actual damages have to be shown as a condition precedent
to relief.
The various states have different and somewhat conflicting theories as to just why exemplary damages should
be allowed. To point out one of the most typical instances,
Georgia holds that exemplary damages are awarded for a
two-fold reason: first, to compensate the wounded feelings of plaintiff and secondly, to deter the wrongdoer.
Moreover, says the Georgia court, an instruction directing
the jury to award exemplary damages if they thought the
public good required their allowance or to deter others is
erroneous.10 Maine and Missouri hold to the opposite line
of reasoning. Missouri bases the whole doctrine on the deterrence of others,' and Maine holds that the purpose of
allowing exemplary damages is to punish12 the wrongdoer
and to protect society and the social order.
Maryland's theory seems to have developed upon the
same lines as that in the two states last named. In Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company v.
Hoeflich 13 a father and his two daughters were passengers
on defendant railroad. No ticket was bought for the
younger sister, a child of twelve years. When the conductor collected the tickets, the father was not with the
daughters. The older sister said that no ticket had been
purchased for the child, nor would one be. The conductor
therefore put both sisters off the train. The older sister
brought action against defendant railroad company. The
Court held that plaintiff was not entitled to exemplary
damages, which are awarded as a punishment for the evil
motive or intent with which the act was done and as an
example or warning to others. This reason for the rule
' 80 Miss. 53, 31 So. 434 (1902).
10 Rattaree v. Chapman, 79 Ga. 574, 4 S. E. 684 (1887).
,1 Kaklegian v. Zakarian, 123 Me. 469, 123 A. 900 (1924).
12 Custer v. Kroegar, 209 Mo. App. 450, 240 S. W. 241 (1922).
1862 Md. 800 (1884).
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Wilmington and
was repeated in Smith v. Philadelphia,
14
Baltimore Railroad Company.
And it seems that this is the better justification of the
rule. For while it is desirable that the individual wrongdoer should be so punished that he will not be as apt to repeat his offense and that the recipient of the wrongful acts
should be compensated, yet this should not be regarded as
the ultimate objective. Deterrence of the individual and
vengeance do not show the complete picture; consideration
of the public welfare as a whole is an essential part thereof.
The treatment afforded the wrongdoer should be sufficiently severe as to deter potential wrongdoers from doing
likewise. In this, the protection of the general public as
a whole, lies the real value of the rule to civilized society.
As to the amount of damages to be allowed, most of
the jurisdictions hold that this is within the discretion of
the jury. 15 But the state of Connecticut takes the singular
view that in an action for assault and battery where exemplary damages are justified in the eyes of the jury, the
amount thereof must be confined to the expenses of litigation, less taxable costs. 1 6 This rule seems to be peculiar to
Connecticut. Maryland follows the more general rule that
the amount of exemplary damages is solely within the discretion of the jury which awards such sum as they think
fit, keeping in mind "the malice of the defendant, the insulting character of his conduct, the rank and position in
life of the several parties, and all the circumstances of the
wrong."'" This latter view is undoubtedly the sounder
one. By restricting the amount of damages as it does, the
Connecticut Court negatives the whole purpose of such
damages. It can hardly be contended that such a stand
will prove to have much of a deterrent effect on either
the individual wrongdoer directly concerned or on the
potential wrongdoer indirectly concerned. Nor could it
be said that the victim is adequately compensated with an
award limited to the expenses of litigation.
The authorities are inconsistent, also, in their consideration of the need for showing actual damage as a condition
precedent to a recovery of exemplary damages. In Flangan v. Womack, 8 the Texas court lays down the rule that
"87 Md. 48, 38 A. 1072 (1897).
156 CORPUrs Juius SECUNDUM 904.
'6 Shupack v. Gordon, 79 Conn. 298, 64 A. 740 (1906); Malley v. Lane,
97 Conn. 133, 115 A. 674 (1921).
17 Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 106 (1883).
1554 Tex. 45 (1880).
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exemplary damages cannot be recovered in the absence
of proof of actual damages. Missouri' 9 and Kansas" have
adhered to the rule of this case. On the other hand, in
Hidden v. Baker,2 ' the Illinois court held that where the
assault is willful and wanton, exemplary damages may be
recovered without proof of actual damages. It is this latter rule that Maryland follows. In Smith v. Philadelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company,2 plaintiff
was a passenger on defendant railroad. He behaved in an
improper manner and spoke abusively to the brakeman.
When he arrived at his destination, he was dilatory in
alighting and thereby delayed the train. The conductor
forcibly jerked him from the platform and plaintiff sued
defendant company for an assault and battery. Although
the court denied plaintiff punitive damages in this intance, it recognized that it would be proper for the jury
to award exemplary damages without first finding that
plaintiff had suffered actual damage.
This holding is quite logical in light of the view taken
by the Maryland court as to the purpose of exemplary
damages. The fact that plaintiff was fortunate enough to
escape actual injury in a particular case ought not to be
sufficient reason for denying exemplary damages. Defendant's punishment ought to be so gauged as to deter
him and others from engaging in conduct which could very
easily result in plaintiff's being injured.
Thus, it is seen that the great weight of authority allows the recovery of exemplary damages in assault and
battery cases upon proof of malice or wantonness on the
part of the defendant; that the purpose of allowing exemplary damages is to compensate the injured party, to punish the wrongdoer, and to deter both the wrongdoers and
others; that the amount of the award, as a general rule,
lies entirely within the discretion of the jury; and that the
rule as to the proof of actual damages varies, with Maryland holding to the view that such proof is not necessary
in order to entitle plaintiff to exemplary damages.
10

Dickinson v. Davis, 284 S. W. 815 (Mo. App., 1926).
20 Behmyer v. Milgram Food Stores, 151 Kan. 921, 101 P. (2d) 912 (1940).
21 190 Ill. App. 561, 60 N. E. 858 (1901).
22 87 Md. 48, 51, 38 A. 1072 (1897).

